Conventions

Object Language. When using a philosopher's term, e.g., Hegel's Pure Being, I will intentionally write this as Pure Being. If there's ambiguity, I'll write something like "Kant's Pure Being differ's from Hegel's Pure Being by blah blah blah blah blah."

Implicit Proof Theory. Assuming I actually get to formalizing any arguments, I'll have to adopt some proof calculus. Since I don't want to adopt axioms "permanently", I'll probably work in some manner of natural deduction, and reformulate "axiomatic systems" as making statements of the form "If axiom a, b, and c hold, then proposition p holds." Proofs are semistructured, somewhat in the spirit of Leslie Lamport's proofs (see [1], [2]).

If I'm formalizing an argument that's running exceedingly long, I may break it up into "helper arguments", which I call lemmas...because that's what they are.

Logical Keywords. In proofs, logical terms are in different font: and, or, not, implies, iff (shorthand for if and only if), and sometimes when modality is needed possibly and necessarily.

I'll also use CamelCase when writing logical functions and predicates (e.g., isSubstance(x) for a simple predicate evaluated with parameter x). In general, if a function begins with isX, it's a predicate.

Definitions. When defining new terms, the new phrase being defined will be highlighted in green as the definiendum (or any alias in parentheses afterwards).

Caution: reading notes will be updated without warning, and I probably won't bother explicitly noting what is updated or changed.